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The theoretical assumptions of deliberative democracy are increasingly embraced by 
policy makers investing in democratic deliberative practices, often without adequate 
empirical verification. One such assertion concerns the stimulus of social learning among 
participants of civic democratic deliberation. Through the innovative use of a natural, 
quasi-experimental design, it is tested if – and among whom – participation in mini-
publics stimulates social learning. In terms of whom, this analysis demonstrates stronger 
social learning according to education level. The results inform a richer theory on the 
impacts of deliberation, as well as better use of limited resources for deliberative practice. 
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Introduction 
The central question this research wants to explore is if – and if so, among whom – 
participation in civic democratic deliberation stimulates social learning. 
This research objective is based on the assumption that democratic deliberation 
strengthens public reason (Chappell, 2012; Christiano, 1997; Fishkin, 1997; Habermas, 
1996; Mill, 1948; Pateman, 1975; Valadez, 2001) and particularly stimulates social 
learning (Barraclough, 2013; Dryzek, 2006; Park, 2000; Welton, 2001). Deliberators 
would learn from each other other’s insights and experiences, which would result in a 
greater understanding and appreciation of opposing views (Barraclough, 2013). However, 
we still lack accurate empirical data on the phenomenon of democratic deliberation for 
this – theoretically assumed – claim to be – empirically – valid. Empirical research on 
democratic deliberation rarely explores social learning thoroughly. And where this has 
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been the case, researchers have been dependent on the indirect measurement of  
participants' self-assessment of social learning (Grönlund, Herne, & Setälä, 2017; 
Hansen, 2004; Luskin, O'Flynn, Fishkin, & Russell, 2014; Michels & De Graaf, 
2010; Price & Cappella, 2002) or informal deliberation (Park, 2000), or on the 
measurement of social learning in digressive behaviour (Grönlund et al., 2017). 
Moreover, there is barely something known on the impact of the self-selection effect 
(cf. who takes part in a citizens’ budget?) on the deliberative effect.  
Through the innovative use of a natural, quasi-experimental design, in which the 
investigation of social learning is directly approached and crucial citizens’ features 
are taken into account, this project will adequately be able to go beyond the rather 
broad existing causal questions in the field. Hence, the overall relevance of this work 
lies in the objective to significantly improve existing democratic theory with in-depth 
empirical data. Hence, despite the theoretical trend in scaling up deliberative 
democracy, we still lack accurate empirical data on the phenomenon of democratic 
deliberation. Furthermore, since ordinary citizens and governments are extensively 
investing in the practical implementation of deliberative practices, it is as well of 
much practical relevance to contribute to insights on the efficiency of those 
investments, from a public-spirited perspective of citizenship – assumed in this 
research.  
The essence of this research concerns a definite empirical investigation of the effect of 
deliberative practices. Practices which cannot be detached from the normative arguments 
on which they are based, but which can never fully reach the requirements political 
theorists aim for. One should note that there is no consensus in the literature on the 
normative – procedural nor outcome – requirements to which deliberative democracy has 
to answer. However, that is beside the point in this work. A research that (merely) aims 
at gathering empirical knowledge on the effect of democratic deliberative practices (not 
at the falsification of deliberative democracy as a theoretical model), does not require 
normative consensus, nor an ideal type of deliberation. It does need a core normative 
basis, but it has to leave open the different empirical, institutional conditions through 
which this normative basis of democratic deliberation can be fulfilled (Chappell, 2012).  
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The notion of ‘deliberative mini-publics’ is broadly used in the literature to outline a 
general framework for civic deliberation1 and will therefore be used as conceptualization 
of deliberative democracy in this work. This notion defines the forums organized by 
policy-makers in which citizens who represent different viewpoints are gathered together 
to moderately deliberate on a particular issue in small groups (Brown, 2006; Fung, 2003; 
Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Setälä & Herne, 2014). For the concrete operationalization of 
the concept, we selected the mini-public in occasion of the participatory budgeting 
program of Antwerp District, in which citizens of the largest and most central district of 
the municipality of Antwerp (Belgium’s most populous city), autonomously deliberated 
on 10% of the district council spending.  
In the first part of this article, we will synthetize the literature in the field out of which 
three hypotheses follow, we will test in this study. In this first part we will also explain 
how we approach social learning – the central dependent variable in this work. In the 
second part we will point out the methods used to test our hypotheses. In the penultimate 
part, we will present the results as answers on the hypotheses. In the concluding part, we 
will come back to the most important empirical insights of our analysis and we will 
reflect on their implications for the academic and societal field; two terrains wherein 
democratic deliberation emerges ever more empathically. 
 
1. Literature Review & Hypotheses 
 
1.1. Social Learning & Citizenship 
Three incentives for policy-makers to engage citizens in their decision-making, in 
between elections (participation in the invited space), can be extracted out of the 
literature: ‘because they have to’ (juridical argument), ‘because it ought to be’ (moral 
argument) and ‘because it is worth it’ (Fung, 2003). The latest refers to the quality of 
decisions (‘better decisions’), the legitimacy of the decisions (‘better support’) and social 
learning (‘better citizens’). It is that final benefit that civic deliberation in particular 
assumes to stimulate (Barraclough, 2013; Dryzek, 2006; Park, 2000; Welton, 2001). In 
this work we endorse Barraclough’s (2013) definition of social learning as civic 
                                                          
1 In what follows we will often refer to ‘deliberation’ whereas systematically ‘democratic deliberation’ is meant. 
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deliberators who learn from each other’s insights and experiences, which results in a 
greater understanding and appreciation of opposing views2.  
This interpretation of social learning has to be framed within the implicit assumption of 
the importance of public reason, on which this research is based3. If democracy is about 
the debate on the decisions which mostly benefit society, then it is our duty being citizens 
(of whom the interests are assumed to be served by our representatives) to think about 
what we think is good for the society as a whole and to act upon it (read: to cast our vote 
accordingly. If policy has to serve society in the end, then the representation of the simple 
sum of individual interest is not only morally counterintuitive, but also materially 
inefficient. Seen from this perspective, social learning is of crucial importance. To be able 
to deliberately choose for a policy whereby the society as a whole is benefitted, it is 
essential to understand and appreciate the perspectives of those who do not share our 
background, environment or experiences.  
For the concrete conceptualization of this notion, we adapt Park’s (2000) classification of 
what he labels in his deliberative democratic research as ‘civility’: one’s understanding 
of why others think the way they do. Even though this definition consist of a pure 
cognitive approach (in contrast with our more broad interpretation of social learning that 
also refers to the appreciation of opposing views), he conceptualizes his notion along 
different axes, of which we reconcile the cognitive and attitudinal in this work4 (cf. 
diagram 1). 
Dia 1. Conceptualisation of social learning 
Social learning =  learning from each other’s insights and experiences  
 understanding and appreciating opposing views 
Cognitive: learning to understand other’s views and to make their own views 
understandable for others 
Attitudinal: learning to transcend the perspective of the personal environment  
                                                          
2 The interpretation of ‘empathy’ in Grönlund, Herne & Setala (2017) matches for a great part with the 
conceptualization of social learning (cf. infra).  
3 Cf. Rawls’ (1971) ‘duty of civility’ and Arendt’s (1967) ‘representative thinking’ or ‘enlarged mindedness’. 
4 The complete conceptualization also consists of a ‘behavior’-indicator: learning to show understanding for other 
opinions, actually making the own opinion understandable for others and appreciating other perspectives. However, 
this indicator is not studied in this (but in following) publication(s). 
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Understanding other’s views as an indicator of social learning (cognitive), does not 
merely imply that people are conscious of what other people think. The ‘understanding’ 
factor indicates reference to learning why other people think the way they do (Siu, 2008). 
A necessary precondition for deliberators to be able to learn about the reasoned arguments 
of others, is that deliberators are able to make themselves understandable for others 
(cognitive). This has also to be seen as a – softer – indicator of social learning. Indeed, 
being able to explain why you hold a particular position implies an (implicit) 
understanding that others do not necessarily share your background or world, or are 
otherwise different. Learning to transcend the perspective of the personal environment 
(attitudinal), subsequently, is about taking the consciousness of these differences (in 
meaning, social position, needs) into account (Janssens & Steyaert, 2001). 
1.2. Empirical Fuzziness about the Deliberative Effect 
Democratic theorists argue that deliberation is good for democracy, as a process (e.g. 
rendering decision-making more legitimate) and/or an outcome (e.g. producing better 
decisions or citizens). Concerning the latter, democratic theorists generally make the 
claim of the transformative power of deliberation (Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & 
Steenbergen, 2004). The reflective aspect of deliberation is claimed to be crucial: 
deliberative reflection would have the potential to transform preferences/interests/beliefs 
in a normative welcome way (Chappell, 2012; Dryzek, 2000; Stokes, 1999; Valadez, 
2001). More specifically, the deliberative process, contrarily to the way citizen 
participation in representative democracies is organized, would have the potential to go 
beyond the mere aggregation of individual interest (Leyenaar, 2007). Some make the 
claim that there would be a reinforcement of the willingness to take the arguments of 
other people into account (Christiano, 1997; Fishkin, 1997), while others even assume 
that deliberation would strengthen the commitment to the common good (Chappell, 2012; 
Habermas, 1996; Mill, 1948; Pateman, 1975; Valadez, 2001). 
Some democratic theorists borrow the term of social learning from social psychological 
theories to formalize the public-spirited transformative effect of deliberation (Dryzek, 
2006; Kanra, 2012; Welton, 2001). Barraclough (2013) argues that participation in 
deliberative processes opens up the opportunity for learning from each other’s insights 
and experiences – as a part or a result of the process – which results in a greater 
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understanding and appreciation of opposing views. What makes an opinion deliberative, 
is that it has grasped and taken into consideration the opposing view of others (Park, 
2000).  
However, based on the current state of the art of the empirical research on democratic 
deliberation, we cannot – empirically – validate the latest-mentioned – theoretically 
assumed – deliberative effect. Previous empirical research concluded that 
deliberation creates more single-peaked preferences (Farrar et al., 2010), that it acts 
as a buffer against more negative feelings towards the out-group (Caluwaerts & 
Reuchamps, 2014) and that it makes people more thoughtful (Grönlund, Bachtiger, 
& Setälä, 2014; Smets & Isernia, 2014). Other conclusions have been that 
deliberation stimulates mutual understanding of conflicting viewpoints (Andersen & 
Hansen, 2007; Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014). It has also been derived from 
earlier research that deliberation leads to a greater cosmopolitan and collective 
orientation of preferences (Gastil, Bacci, & Dollinger, 2010), as well as to preferences 
that are more environmentally friendly (Fishkin, 1997). 
All of these conclusions are in line with the transformative character argued for and 
assumed by deliberative theorists. However, there has been disproportionally less 
attention given to the more profound relationship between social learning and deliberative 
democracy in empirical research than this has been the case in democratic theory.  
Social learning implies more than merely developing empathy as the understanding of 
opposing views (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014). Social 
learning also presumes that one learns to take other visions into account. This is as well 
not necessarily implied when deliberation appears to greaten the expression of 
preferences towards ‘the common good’ (Fishkin, 1997; Gastil et al., 2010), which just 
as well can be an utterance of a mere personal consideration, that – in the search for self-
interest – has unintendedly a public-spirited outcome. Moreover, from the state of the art 
it is to be derived that empirical research in which social learning is approached as a key 
dependent variable, researchers have been largely dependent on participants’ self-
assessment of the perception of an evolution in social learning (Michels & De Graaf, 
2010; Price & Cappella, 2002), on the evolution of participants’ self-assessment of the 
willingness to consider other views and the measurement of digressive behaviour 
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(Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Grönlund et al., 2017; Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014), or 
even on the self-assessment of deliberation as ‘the frequency of political conversations 
people think they have with those with whom they disagree’ (Park, 2000). This means 
that up until today, we still lack studies in which the assumed deliberative effect on social 
learning is directly and formally approached. This makes the empirical validity of the far-
reaching claim on social learning still unclear. 
In the meantime, the importance of taking the perspectives of others with a different 
background, environment or experience into account, is mounting in societal debate. 
More and more, the moral and material desirability of citizens (read: consumers) who 
vote – in a democracy – for a party because they assume they will lower their taxes or 
make their recently bought solar panels economically cost-effective, is put into question. 
In such a political context, the societal importance of social learning is considerably 
rising. From this point of view, policy makers are increasingly inspired by the persuasive 
theoretical assumption that democratic deliberation stimulates social learning. 
Given its reasonable theoretical explanation and some meaningful empirical indications 
in previous research, we could expect that deliberation actually stimulates social learning. 
H1: Participation in mini-publics stimulates social learning among deliberators. 
The objective of this research is, however, not limited to the contribution of empirical 
knowledge on the mere outcome of deliberative practices. This work is also characterized 
by the ambition to discover some meaningful insights on the explanation of the measured 
deliberative outcome. At present day, researchers are therefore still explicitly stressing 
the need to come to a deeper understanding of the deliberative outcomes (Setälä & Herne, 
2014). Generally, empiricists forgot to turn the page and consequently ignored the effect 
of the individual features of civic deliberators. Nevertheless, the literature strongly 
indicates that individual features matters in explaining attendance to political 
participation.  
Traditionally, it is assumed that one’s socio-economic situation is crucial in forecasting 
political participation (Baum, 2015; Uhlaner, 2001). The presence of certain individual 
resources are supposed to be crucial in seeing opportunities in political participation and 
hence would explain the choice to engage (Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995).   
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Whereas a lot of different attributes are linked to this theory, only few empirical data has 
been collected concerning real-world participatory initiatives in the invited space. 
However, the little previous research on this domain does indicate that gender and 
education are crucial in explaining engagement in participatory initiatives (Dalton, 
Scarrow, & Cain, 2004; McNulty, 2015).  
Hence, if we assume that deliberation disproportionally attracts men and the higher 
educated, the question rises to what extent this interacts with the actual deliberation and 
it outcomes. If we a) suppose that deliberation stimulates social learning among its 
participating citizens, but b) also assume that those citizens hold some – politically crucial 
– distinct features, then the question is if those features are decisive for the deliberative 
effect on social learning to come about (self-selection thesis)? Even if the opposite could 
also hold (that the deliberative effect is precisely greater among those who do not already 
hold political favourable resources – socialization thesis), we can reasonably assume the 
following: 
H2.1:   Men learn more socially than women through participation in mini-publics 
H2.2:  Higher-educated learn more socially than lower-educated through participation 
in mini-publics  
    
2. Methods 
Because we are dealing with a complex political phenomenon (Eckstein, 1975), of which 
the empirical aspects are still left unchartered (Ragin, 1987), and in which we want to test 
a causal assumption (Abelson et al., 2003), we argue that the case study is the most 
accurate method to address our research objective. This means that – theoretically – we 
rein in external validity. However, one has to notice that in the current context in which 
deliberative democratic experiments in practice take on so many distinct forms (topic, 
decision-making, length, role of moderator/experts) and the impact of those conditions is 
still unknown, external validity is by definition unachievable. However, this does not 
mean that one cannot strive to validate the institutional context.  
In contrast with many other experiments in the field, we study a real-world deliberative 
practice and thus citizens in a natural experiment. More specifically we selected the case 
of the participatory budgeting program of Antwerp District. The district (a sublevel of the 
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municipality) enjoys a directly-elected sub-local council and disposes over those – 
constrained – powers that concern the citizens’ most direct living environment (streets, 
public squares, green spaces, culture, sports, communication, targeting youth and 
seniors). Since 2014 Antwerp District has yearly set up forums in three different phases 
in which a diverse group of citizens5 moderately deliberates in small groups on the 
spending of €1.1m (10% of district council spending). In this way, the Antwerpian 
Citizen’s Budget represents three mini-publics, in which participation in every of the three 
phases is open to every district inhabitant.  
The first phase consists of eight identical meetings (in eight different neighbourhoods of 
the districts) of about 2h30, which all take place in March. During these deliberative 
meetings, citizens decided on which twelve topics they want to spend the Citizens’ 
Budget on. About a month later, there are two identical meetings, which also last about 
2h30, in which citizens decide on how to divide the money on the twelve selected topics 
of the first phase. The third and final phase takes place in October and consists of an 
afternoon in which the citizens decide, in several topical rounds, which specific projects 
they want to finance with the money foreseen for each topic.  
With the Antwerpian case, we study the prevalent (urban) practice of citizens’ budgets as 
mini-publics. These practices – opposed to other real-world deliberations – are not 
characterized by specific policy questions, nor distorted by ruling political power 
relations – dependent on the particular case at hand. Citizens’ budgets are characterized 
by an universal setting in which a mini-public can independently decide on politically 
allocated money. Furthermore, with the Antwerpian case, we selected a case of which the 
particular decision-making procedure, role of moderators and length has been copied in 
foreign cities and municipalities. In that way, we argue that the Antwerpian Citizens’ 
Budget opens up the opportunity to maximize the internal and external validity within our 
case study research.   
Contrary to traditional cross-sectional research, we developed a design that allows us to 
test causal relations accurately. This research is based on unique panel data of the 
                                                          
5 Participation is open to every district inhabitant, which in the first edition of the program led to a rather traditional 
participatory (elite) public. By focusing on informing and inspiring hard-to-reach citizens (youngsters, people with a 
migration background), the organization now succeeds in achieving a remarkable diverse group of participants (cf. 
92% of the participants agreed that a diversity of opinions was represented at the tables).  
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participants of the Antwerpian Citizens’ Budget 2017 before and after their participation 
in a respective phase of the deliberative process. This one group pretest posttest design 
allows us to analyse the evolution in social learning for each individual. Hence, we 
measured the upper-mentioned indicators of social learning (cognitive and attitudinal) 
through a pre-/post survey with open-ended questions, of which the answers were coded 
qualitatively6 and the results analysed quantitatively.   
More specifically, we asked the respondents (before and after every phase of the 
trajectory) on which of the topics7 they would certainly want to spend money. The answer 
on this is not as such of much relevance for this research, but acted as a cue for the 
sequential questions. Hence, we subsequently asked for (all of) the (specific) reasons for 
their choice. This survey design has been successfully introduced by Cappella et al. 
(2002), in research on the impact of informal deliberation on one’s argumentation for the 
choice of this or that presidential candidate.  
In contrast with the research of Cappella et al. (2002), the amount of given arguments is 
of no relevance in this research. Our data-analysis focusses on the content of the given 
arguments. In that way we can study if respondents are able to think of understandable 
arguments for their own position (cognitive), if they either or not transcend the personal 
environment (attitudinal), and the respective pre/post evolution in this. If one offers either 
few or many arguments, does as such tell us nothing about the comprehensibility or public 
reason of those arguments.  
For the coding of these arguments, a coding scheme has been developed based on the 
Discourse Quality Index (DQI) (Steiner et al., 2004). Since the DQI is not to be seen as a 
method to measure argumentation, but is used as an index to analyse reported 
argumentation, we argue that it is a well-founded8 instrument to apply on either form of 
deliberative argumentation; whether it has been reported before, during or after 
deliberation, as an answer subsequently to explicit questions or not. Since the index has 
been initially developed for parliamentary deliberation, it is common to adapt the index 
                                                          
6 To become maximum consistency on the (pre- vs. post-) coding, one coder coded all answer. Afterwards, 30% of the 
answers were recoded by a second coder. Krippendorff’s alpha measured both for the own argumentation and for the 
argumentation of others .74. 
7 In the second phase we explicitly asked which of the at the first phase selected topics one preferred (see appendix I 
for the actual question wording). 
8 Yet unconventional.  
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for use for civic deliberation (Steffensmeier & Schenck-Hamlin, 2008). More 
specifically, it is desirably to focus not only on ‘arguments’, but also on narratives and 
reasons (e.g. personal stories and anecdotes).  
In this way, these elements of the DQI which are relevant according to the dependent 
variable in question – the level of justification (inferior, qualified, sophisticated) and the 
content of justifications (neutral, group interests, common good)  –, have been updated to 
the particular context of this research. Specifically, we made the distinction between 
unqualified, qualified and qualified public argumentations. An argumentation was coded 
as unqualified if no reasons or only reasons without a clear linkage with the opinion was 
reported. For instance the following argumentations in favour of more green: “because 
that is good for society” or “because there is a need for”. Hereby it is unclear why this is 
the case and thus could equally be linked to any other opinion. When at least one reason 
with a clear linkage with the opinion was given, an argumentation was coded as qualified 
(cf. cognitive). For instance this argumentation in favour of road safety: “The city has 
become extremely busy and noisy. This makes it very unsafe for the vulnerable road 
users”. The qualified public code was given to argumentations with at least one reason 
with a clear linkage with the opinion whereby an individual or particular group context is 
being transcended (and thus other specific groups, the society as a whole or the 
environment is included in the argumentation) (cf. attitude). For instance the following 
argumentation in favour of more green: “The city is too dense, which effects the air 
quality. More green can improve this”.  
Hence, we can explore social learning by studying the pre-post evolution of the coded 
argumentation (cf. table 1). When an argument becomes ‘public (qualified)’ or 
‘qualified’, social learning has taken place. In the first case, the respondent shows having 
learnt to transcend the personal environment. This can concern both an evolution of a 
(non-public) qualified, as an unqualified pre-argumentation. In the second case, the 
respondent shows having learnt to think of understandable arguments for one’s own 
argumentation, the more soft form of social learning (‘+’ instead of ‘+ +’). The latest can 
only concern unqualified pre-argumentations that evolve to (non-public) qualified post-
argumentations.  
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Table 1. Summary individual evolution own argumentation 
 
Next to the argumentation of the own opinion, we also asked for potential opposing 
opinions, as measurement for the second – stronger – cognitive indicator of social 
learning. By analogy with the above mentioned open-ended survey design of Capella et 
al. (2002)9, participants were asked for specific reasons vis-à-vis their proper reported 
priority other citizens could have not to spend money on it10. These answers were coded 
in compliance with the own argumentation as described above: qualified vs. unqualified 
argumentation. An evolution from a pre-unqualified to a post-qualified argumentation 
shows that respondents learnt to understand other’s views (cf. table 2).  
In this chapter we focus on the survey results of the first and second phase of the Citizens’ 
Budget of 201711. 
Of the 175 civic deliberators of the first phase and the 102 of the second, respectively 77 
(phase 1) and 36 (phase 2) have completed both the pre- as the post-survey12. Hence, we 
                                                          
9 In their research labeled as ‘argumentative repertoire’.  
10 See appendix I for the actual question wording.  
11 The third and final phase is not incorporated in our analysis since the response rate at that phase was too low to 
achieve valid results (9%). The fact that this response rate is much lower than at phase 1 and 2 (whereas the same 
technique and strategy vis-à-vis similar – and often also the same – respondents was used) is remarkable. We get back 
to this in the discussion part.  
12 Of whom 32 participants at the first phase and 23 at the second phase completed the pre-survey online. Every other 
pre-survey was completed physically on site, every post-survey online. The social learners (cf. infra) who completed 
the pre-survey physically are overrepresented at phase 1 (with regard to the social learners who completed the pre-
survey online), whereas they are precisely – similarly strongly – underrepresented at phase 2. Hence, we conclude that 
there is no net-effect of the way (physically or online) the (pre-) survey was completed. One has to remark that we did 
not opt to let participants fill in the post-survey on site. Seen the nature of the questions, we argue that answers in such 
a context would be contaminated by mere memory (instead of knowledge). Seen the quasi-experimental set-up of this 
study it is, however, important to collect the post-results relatively quickly after the end of the deliberation (because of 
contamination by other post-processes or –events). Hence, by means of clear communication and fast follow-up, we 
succeeded in receiving 58% of the post-results (phase 1 and 2) within the day after the deliberation. Answers which we 
received after more than 5 days, were no longer registered. 
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become reliable response rates of respectively 46% and 35%. Since a lot of the non-
response concerns dropout after the pre-surveys, we have considerable proportions of 
socio-demographic information of the total population at our disposal (74% of all 
participants in phase 1, 65% in phase 213). Hence, if we compare the sub-samples14 ‘pre- 
and post-response’ vs. ‘pre-response only’ on gender, age and education, then we notice 
no statistical differences15. This means that the respondents of which we have the data to 
analyse their social learning, do not differ from these civic deliberators who do not appear 
in our social learning analysis. This means that there is no reasons to presume that these 
other deliberators learnt differently, which preserves the internal validity of our results. 
Table 2. Summary individual evolution argumentation of others 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Does it work? 
Firstly, we ascertain that regarding the argumentation of the own opinion, the vast 
majority of participants already had a qualified opinion at the beginning of the 
deliberation: 67% at the start of phase 1, 78% before phase 2. At the beginning of the first 
phase, more than one third of these already reported a qualified public argument (25%). 
At the start of phase 2, this public variant concerned more than half of the qualified 
arguments (42%).  
                                                          
13 Furthermore a part of the non-response at phase 2 represents participants who also participated at phase 1 and of 
whom we at that stage gathered sociodemographic data. 
14 See appendix II.  
15 Based on a paired samples test. 
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Figures 1 & 2 show the result of the comparison – for each respondent – between that 
pre-argumentation and the reported argumentation after the respective first and second 
phase of the Citizens’ Budget. When an argument becomes ‘public (qualified)’ or 
‘qualified’, social learning has taken place (cf. table 1).  
Fig. 1.  Phase 1: individual evolution own argumentation (N = 64) 
 
The first and second phase show a similar, positive effect of social learning. After the first 
phase we see an effect of social learning among 27% of the respondents: 13% shows a 
qualified argumentation whereas they did not have this at their disposal before the 
deliberation, among 14% the post-argumentation shows an evolution to a (qualified) 
public character. At the end of the second phase we found that 36% of the respondents 
demonstrates – based on the argumentation for the own opinion – to have learnt socially. 
Among 7% there is an evolution to a qualified argumentation, among 29%, there is an 
evolution to a (qualified) public argument – the stronger indicator of social learning.  
Moreover one has to notice that the vast majority of the respondents who have not been 
categorized as having learnt socially, already had a qualified argumentation at the start 
and were able to maintain this level of argumentation (53% in phase 1, 46% in phase 2).  
More than one third in phase 1 (19%) and more than half among them in phase 2 (25%) 
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even possessed a qualified public argument at the start. In other words, these respondents 
were not able to learn socially. However, they succeeded in maintaining this type of 
argumentation. That they – because they did not evolve – are resorted within the rest 
group of non-learners, enforces the positive effect of social learning when it comes to the 
argument of the own opinion. Furthermore, we ascertain only a – in relation with the 
upper mentioned positive effect – limited negative effect (11% at phase 1, 14% at phase 
2); in casu respondents of whom the public qualified pre-argumentation evolved to a mere 
qualified post-argumentation (‘becomes private’), or of whom the (mere) qualified pre-
argumentation became an unqualified post-argumentation (‘becomes unqualified’).  
Fig. 2. Phase 2: individual evolution own argumentation (N = 28) 
 
Secondly, corresponding the reported argumentation regarding the opinion of others (who 
would not want to finance the concerned priority), we found out that three quart of those 
arguments were unqualified at the beginning of the Citizens’ Budget: 74% at phase 1, 
77% at phase 2. In other words: contrarily regarding the own opinion, only few 
respondents were able to give concrete reasons why others would not want to finance 
their priority before the start of the deliberation.  
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Figures 3 shows the results of the comparison – for each respondents between this pre-
argumentation and the reported argument at the end of the respective first and second 
phase of the Citizens’ Budget.  
Fig. 3. Phase 1 & 2: individual evolution argumentation of others 
 
Again we discovered a similar, positive evolution in social learning in the first and second 
phase. After the first phase, we detected an effect on social learning among 21% of the 
respondents, after the second phase, this is the case among 22% of the respondents. This 
means that more than one out of five respondents were not able to give concrete reasons 
why other citizens would not support the same priority at the outset, but were capable of 
doing so after the deliberation.  
Furthermore, one has to remark that three respondents (6%) subsequently to the first 
phase16, and no one succeeding the second phase reported no (concrete) reasons where 
they have been able to do so at the respective starts of the phases. This implies that a part 
of the status quo group, concerns respondents who maintained their qualitative pre-
                                                          
16 A possible explanation is that respondents did less effort for the post-survey (cf. survey fatigue due to identical 
questions in a short time frame. 
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argumentation. So, hereby it goes as well that they (since they did not evolve) were not 
labelled as social learners and thus enforce the positive effect on social learning.  
Finally, we discovered that all respondents – but two (in phase 2) – who learnt socially 
regarding the argumentation for the own opinion (in phase 1 or 2), differed from those 
who learnt socially on the argumentation of the opinion of others. In that way, we can 
conclude that 48%17 of the respondents learnt socially in phase 1, and 51%18 in phase 2. 
These learners were both in phase 1 and 2 proportionally spread out over the distinct 
meetings in the respective phases19.   
At first sight, this latest empirical conclusion seems counterintuitive; how can you learn 
to know the arguments that oppose your own opinion (social learning on the argument of 
others), without also having learnt arguments that support the own position (social 
learning on own opinion)? Above, however, we mentioned that there has been a ‘positive 
status quo group’ regarding the argumentation of the own opinion. Hence, we ascertained 
that the social learners regarding the argument of the opinion of others, were respondents 
who already possessed and maintained a qualified (public) argumentation for the own 
position (except the two respondents who both learnt on the argumentation of others as 
of their own).  
With the conclusion that about half of the participants learnt socially, the results of this 
case study suggest the confirmation of H1. It is not unimportant to stress hereby that this 
number is not the result of mainly soft social learning (cf. own argumentation becomes 
qualified). The positive evolution corresponds for 73% in phase 120 and for 88% in phase 
221 with learning to understand the meaning of others (cf. argumentation of the position 
of others becomes qualified) and to transcend the personal environment (cf. own 
argumentation becomes public) – the stronger indicators of social learning.  
 
                                                          
17 27% + 21% 
18 36% + 15% [(4 (new social learners on a total of 6)/N=27) = 15] 
19 All of the 8 encounters within the first phase represented at least 7% of the social learners. At phase 2, 57% of the 
social learners deliberated at the first encounter on Saturday, 43% deliberated at the second encounter on Sunday.  
20 [21% (qualified evolution regarding the opinion of others) + 14% (public evolution regarding the own opinion)] / 
[21% + 14% + 13% (qualified evolution regarding the own opinion)]. 
21 [22% (qualified evolution regarding the opinion of others) + 29% (public evolution regarding the own opinion)] / 
[22% + 29% + 7% (qualified evolution regarding the own opinion)]. 
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3.2. Among whom?  
Next we want to find out under which conditions this effect of social learning takes place. 
Therefore we will focus in what follows on the two individual conditions of which 
previous empirical research indicated as crucial in one’s choice to respond to participatory 
invitations – and thus could potentially be important in moderating the deliberative effect: 
gender and education (cf. supra).   
Surprisingly, the Citizens’ Budget’s participants were approximately equally distributed 
regarding gender and education. In phase 1 participants consisted by 46% out of women 
and 46% out of low educated22. In phase 2 these numbers were respectively 48% and 
44%. In this way, this case opens up as an opportunity to establish internal valid results 
on these crucial individual conditions.  
When we compare all the participants who learnt socially in phase 1 or 2 with those who 
did not learn in the respective phases, then we ascertain no statistical differences on 
gender (N = 140, phi = .023, p > .05), nor on education23 (N = 137, phi = .052, p > .05). 
However, if we compare the stronger forms of social learning (own argumentation 
becomes public, argumentation of others become qualified) with the softer form (own 
argumentation becomes qualified), then we do discover statistical differences on 
education (N = 44, p < .05). The significance of this effect disappears when we compare 
the stronger forms of social learning with all those who did not learn strongly, nor softly 
socially. 
This analysis does not lead in the direction of H2.1, but it does suggests the confirmation 
of H2.2: we concluded that you do not have a greater chance of stronger social learning 
being highly educated or manly, but that if you learn socially, you do have a greater 
chance of learning more thoroughly from the insights and experiences of others when 
being highly educated.  
  
                                                          
22 High educated vs. maximum secondary education. 
23 Every time a participant learnt or did not learn socially (own argumentation, argumentation others – phase 1, phase 
2), his or her gender or education level was taken into account (instead of ending up with a less accurate comparison 
of heterogeneous groups of respondents that learnt socially on the own or the other’s argumentation versus those who 
did not at all learnt socially). We exclude the positive status quo group from the non-social learners, since they could 
not learn socially due to a priori stronger social learning indicators (cf. infra).  
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4. Conclusion & Discussion 
In this article we answered the causal question if participation in democratic deliberation 
stimulates social learning – among whom? Based on a reiteration of the three central 
empirical conclusion of this natural, quasi-experimental study of the case of the 
Antwerpian Citizens’ Budget, we explain in this concluding part, the scientific and 
societal relevance of this work.  
Through a comparison of pre- and post-survey data, we concluded in the first place hat 
approximately one third of the participants were able to give concrete reasons for their 
own opinion at the end of the deliberation, where they were not capable of doing so 
beforehand (27% at phase 1, 36% at phase 2). Moreover, most of them transcended the 
personal environment in giving these concrete post-reasons, where they did not so at the 
start of the deliberation.  
Furthermore we ascertained that most of the participants already were able to give 
concrete reasons for their own position at the start and were capable of maintaining this 
way of reasoning. For a significant part of these participants (19% at phase 1 and 25% at 
phase 2), these concrete reasons already had a public character (whereby the personal 
environment was transcended). In other words, these participants could not learn socially, 
but they succeed in maintaining this type of reasoning. However, because this does not 
concern an evolution, they were not categorized as social learners. This reinforces the 
positive effect of social learning on the argumentation of the own opinion.  
Secondly, we concluded that participants were afterwards better capable of giving reasons 
why others would have a different opinion. One out of five respondents were able to 
report concrete reasons why others would not agree with the concerned respondent’s own 
opinion, where they could not report this beforehand (21% at phase 1, 22% at phase 2). 
Again, it is the case that a part of the group that was not labelled as social learners are 
concerning participants who beforehand already reported concrete reasons for another 
opinion and repeated this afterwards. This conclusion – derived from direct measurements 
– confirms the formerly assessed evolution of participants’ self-assessment of the 
willingness to consider other views (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Grönlund et al., 2017; 
Hansen, 2004; Luskin et al., 2014).  
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This strongly positive relationship between deliberation and social learning is confirmed 
by two additional observations. It follows from our analysis that the two upper-mentioned 
groups of social learners (those who learnt on the own argument, those who learnt on the 
argument of others) consist exclusively of different participants – let alone two 
participants at phase 2. Concretely, this means that not less than half of the participants 
of the Antwerpian Citizens’ Budget, learnt socially (48% at phase 1, 51% at phase 2). 
Furthermore, we ascertained that the strongest ways of social learning took place. Citizens 
not only learnt to argue for their own opinion (the softer indicator of social learning), but 
they predominantly transcended their own environment in doing so, as well as were able 
to reason from another environment out of which they delivered concrete reasons against 
their own position.  
That these evolutions occurred through respective deliberations of de facto an hour and a 
half, additionally appears to confirm the theoretical assumption of the deliberative effect 
on social learning. Moreover, these micro-level insights indicates direction to the 
systemic turn.  One has to remark that because of the large-scale size and strength of the 
effect, the absence of a control group is de facto neutralized. Indeed, nothing indicates 
that non-participating citizens learnt socially to the same extent between a regular Sunday 
afternoon and a blue Monday morning24. Also, that the mere pre-surveying of 
argumentation would have as such a strong social learning effect, is difficult to explain. 
Definitely vis-à-vis a subsequent debate in which the exchange of arguments is central in 
the decision-making. However, when the sample size is sufficiently great, it can be a 
suggestion for further research to explore the panel conditioning effect of the research 
design at hand.   
Mini-publics are more topical than ever and are not rarely justified by their presumed 
effect on social learning. In this way this research suggest that the rising investments in 
deliberative democratic experiments are desirable – in light of the importance of public 
reason in citizenship.  
Nevertheless one has to handle the conclusion of this research carefully. This study 
concerns the first empirical data on the deliberative effect on social learning in which the 
                                                          
24 Indication of the time in which the pre- and post-surveys were completed (cf. footnote 6: 58% of the post-results 
were received within the day after the deliberation). 
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variables are respectively directly and formally measured. Although we obtained an 
internally valid measuring instrument with the use of an innovated natural, quasi-
experimental set-up, the number of participants was relatively limited. In other words, we 
have to await to what extent further research (to most similar cases) confirms the results 
of this study.  
However, we selected a case which – because of its common participatory budgeting 
setting, its context of a diverse city, its decision-making model that has been copied and 
implemented abroad – tells us more than merely something about an evolution among 
citizens in a Belgian city.  
In addition, we wish to stress again that since our response rate at the third phase was too 
low (9%), this final phase has not been incorporated in our analysis25. At the same time, 
we used the same questioning technique and strategy vis-à-vis similar – and often also 
the same – participants. At this phase, in which the funding of concrete projects is at stake, 
participants reported on site that they ‘have no time to complete the survey’ since they 
wanted ‘to use the time before the start of the deliberation to campaign for their own 
project’ and ‘to search for allies’. This suggests that the context of this third phase is less 
favourable for evolutions in social learning. A qualitative subsequent analysis of the 
respective actual deliberations (in which the final phase is incorporated), can clarify this 
matter. 
One has to remark that we approached phase 1 and 2 as if they were separated independent 
variables.  However, in practice there is overlap between the two phases: more than half 
of the participants of phase 2, participated as well in phase 1. Nevertheless, further 
analysis demonstrated that previous participation (at a previous edition or in the previous 
phase)26, or former social learning (in a previous phase) had no (positive, nor negative) 
effect on the evolution in social learning. Since this analysis is based on a small N (a 
subsample of a sample of a relative small population), further research is needed to 
confirm this conclusion. This may learn us more on the temporality and specificity of the 
effect on social learning.  Does the effect of social learning only concerns the deliberative 
                                                          
25 Cf. footnote 5.  
26 49% of all participants was engaged in one of the former editions of the Antwerpian Citizens’ Budget. 56% of this 
year participants at phase 2, participated as well in phase 1 of this edition.  
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issues? Or those these – and other – effects (also) play on other fields and on the longer 
term? 
The third and last central empirical conclusion raised more specifically from the empirical 
illiteracy on the impact of the influence of the self-selection effect on the deliberative 
effect. Our analysis showed that not all citizens are equally susceptible to social learning 
through participation in democratic deliberation; not men, but high educated 
demonstrated stronger social learning. Whereas high and low educated people have an 
equal chance of learning socially, our results do indicate that it is being highly educated 
that makes one more favourable to learn to understand other opinions and to transcend 
the perspective of the personal environment, instead of merely learning to reason for one’s 
own opinion. This result offers support for the self-selection thesis (cf. fig. 4), which 
should be tested by further quantitative research, whereas qualitative research on 
respondents’ deliberative experiences should offer an explanation of the in this case 
established phenomenon.  
Fig. 4. Education as moderating variable on high social learning 
  
If further research would confirm this insight, then the question raises if and how 
deliberation can lead to more inclusive social learning. How do we make sure that 
citizens of whom the participation to deliberation is less evident, have equal chances to 
develop as more (politically) fortunate citizens? A concern inherently connected with 
the public-spirited perspective of citizenship, from where this research started. 
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Appendix  
I. Translated27 question wording argumentation of the own opinion (1) and opinion 
of others (2). 
Phase 1 pre-survey 
- At the starting moment you will decide on the spending of the Antwerpian 
Citizens’ Budget of this year in consultation with fellow citizens. If it was up to 
you, where would you definitely spend money on? Type below the topics (for 
instance better sidewalks, construction skate park, neighbourhood concerts,…) for 
which you would definitely foresee money. [textbox] 
- For which of the chosen topics is it most important to you that money is foreseen? 
Type below the topic for which you above all want to foresee money. [textbox] 
- Why this topic? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that come to 
mind) [textbox] (1)  
- Certain citizens of the district would rather spend the money on other topics. What 
specific reasons with regard to your preferred topic could other people have not 
to spend money on it? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that 
come to mind) [textbox] (2)  
Phase 1 post-survey 
- At the starting moment you decided in consultation with fellow citizens by 
consensus on which five topics you as a table would spend money. If it was up to 
you, would you choose for these same five topics? [Y/N] 
- If it was up to you, for which topic is it most important that money would be 
foreseen? [textbox] 
- Why this topic? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that come to 
mind) [textbox] (1) 
- Certain citizens of the district would rather spend the money on other topics. What 
specific reasons with regard to your preferred topic could other people have not 
                                                          
27 Actual questions were asked in Dutch.  
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to spend money on it? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that 
come to mind) [textbox] (2)  
Phase 2 pre-survey 
- At the district forum you will decide on the spending of the Antwerpian Citizens’ 
Budget of this year in consultation with other citizens. If it was up to you, for 
which of the twelve selected topics would you foresee the greatest part of the 1.1 
million euro? [list of the twelve selected topics at phase 1] 
- Why do you think that the greatest part of the budget should go to this topic? 
(Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that come to mind) [textbox] 
(1)  
- Certain citizens of the district would rather spend the most money on other topics. 
What specific reasons with regard to your preferred topic could other people have 
to spend less money on it? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that 
come to mind) [textbox] (2) 
Phase 2 post-survey 
- At the district forum you decided in consultation with other citizens by consensus 
how you as a table would distribute the Citizen’s Budget. If it was up to you, 
would you choose for the same distribution? [Y/N] 
- If it was up to you, for which of the twelve discussed topics would you foresee 
the greatest part of the money? [textbox] 
- Why this topic? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that come to 
mind) [textbox] (1) 
- Certain citizens of the district would rather spend the most money on other topics. 
What specific reasons with regard to your preferred topic other people could have 
to spend less money on it? (Please name as specific as possible all the reasons that 
come to mind) [textbox] (2)  
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II. Sub-samples  
 
 
